The conflict in the South China Sea is increasingly being viewed as serious. Historically, conflicts have started from the contested territory between France and Japan, to the result of the power vacuum of the Second World War. There are no international documents that provide clarity on sovereignty in the South China Sea. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam are countries that have overlapping territorial claims that currently arise more due to domestic economic, geostrategic and political factors. As a non-claimant country, Indonesia has a role to facilitate and resolve the conflict, because Indonesian waters, the North Natuna Sea, also have territorial claims incised. The alignment of the ZEEI and the Nine Dashes has implications for regional economic and defense arrangements. This article uses qualitative analysis methods to explore three objectives. First, explore historical, philosophical and legal approaches in discussing the background to the conflict. Second, analyzing the attitudes and perspectives of Indonesia's strategic position in the South China Sea. Third, proposing several possible recommendations needed by Indonesia to resolve the South China Sea conflict with the roles and actions needed for international and regional goals. Indonesia as a non-claimant country has a diplomatic role as a mediator, honest broker and trust builder in the handling of the South China Sea conflict. Strategic position in the South China Sea proposes several possible recommendations needed by Indonesia to resolve the South China Sea conflict with the roles and actions required for international and regional goals. Indonesia as a non-claimant country has a defense diplomacy role as a mediator, an intermediary that can build trust in the handling of the South China Sea conflict.
| Published in | Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 4, Issue 2) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12 |
| Page(s) | 33-40 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group |
South China Sea Conflict, Territorial Claims, Indonesia Defense Policy
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APA Style
Maulana Anton, Sukristyanto Agus, Ibnu Achluddin. (2021). Indonesian Defense Diplomacy in the Resolution of the South China Sea Conflict. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4(2), 33-40. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12
ACS Style
Maulana Anton; Sukristyanto Agus; Ibnu Achluddin. Indonesian Defense Diplomacy in the Resolution of the South China Sea Conflict. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2021, 4(2), 33-40. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12
AMA Style
Maulana Anton, Sukristyanto Agus, Ibnu Achluddin. Indonesian Defense Diplomacy in the Resolution of the South China Sea Conflict. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2021;4(2):33-40. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12
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Download@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12,
author = {Maulana Anton and Sukristyanto Agus and Ibnu Achluddin},
title = {Indonesian Defense Diplomacy in the Resolution of the South China Sea Conflict},
journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
volume = {4},
number = {2},
pages = {33-40},
doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20210402.12},
abstract = {The conflict in the South China Sea is increasingly being viewed as serious. Historically, conflicts have started from the contested territory between France and Japan, to the result of the power vacuum of the Second World War. There are no international documents that provide clarity on sovereignty in the South China Sea. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam are countries that have overlapping territorial claims that currently arise more due to domestic economic, geostrategic and political factors. As a non-claimant country, Indonesia has a role to facilitate and resolve the conflict, because Indonesian waters, the North Natuna Sea, also have territorial claims incised. The alignment of the ZEEI and the Nine Dashes has implications for regional economic and defense arrangements. This article uses qualitative analysis methods to explore three objectives. First, explore historical, philosophical and legal approaches in discussing the background to the conflict. Second, analyzing the attitudes and perspectives of Indonesia's strategic position in the South China Sea. Third, proposing several possible recommendations needed by Indonesia to resolve the South China Sea conflict with the roles and actions needed for international and regional goals. Indonesia as a non-claimant country has a diplomatic role as a mediator, honest broker and trust builder in the handling of the South China Sea conflict. Strategic position in the South China Sea proposes several possible recommendations needed by Indonesia to resolve the South China Sea conflict with the roles and actions required for international and regional goals. Indonesia as a non-claimant country has a defense diplomacy role as a mediator, an intermediary that can build trust in the handling of the South China Sea conflict.},
year = {2021}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Indonesian Defense Diplomacy in the Resolution of the South China Sea Conflict AU - Maulana Anton AU - Sukristyanto Agus AU - Ibnu Achluddin Y1 - 2021/04/26 PY - 2021 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12 DO - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12 T2 - Journal of Political Science and International Relations JF - Journal of Political Science and International Relations JO - Journal of Political Science and International Relations SP - 33 EP - 40 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2640-2785 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210402.12 AB - The conflict in the South China Sea is increasingly being viewed as serious. Historically, conflicts have started from the contested territory between France and Japan, to the result of the power vacuum of the Second World War. There are no international documents that provide clarity on sovereignty in the South China Sea. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam are countries that have overlapping territorial claims that currently arise more due to domestic economic, geostrategic and political factors. As a non-claimant country, Indonesia has a role to facilitate and resolve the conflict, because Indonesian waters, the North Natuna Sea, also have territorial claims incised. The alignment of the ZEEI and the Nine Dashes has implications for regional economic and defense arrangements. This article uses qualitative analysis methods to explore three objectives. First, explore historical, philosophical and legal approaches in discussing the background to the conflict. Second, analyzing the attitudes and perspectives of Indonesia's strategic position in the South China Sea. Third, proposing several possible recommendations needed by Indonesia to resolve the South China Sea conflict with the roles and actions needed for international and regional goals. Indonesia as a non-claimant country has a diplomatic role as a mediator, honest broker and trust builder in the handling of the South China Sea conflict. Strategic position in the South China Sea proposes several possible recommendations needed by Indonesia to resolve the South China Sea conflict with the roles and actions required for international and regional goals. Indonesia as a non-claimant country has a defense diplomacy role as a mediator, an intermediary that can build trust in the handling of the South China Sea conflict. VL - 4 IS - 2 ER -
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